By Sahana Bhagat

Technological advances are rapidly outpacing our ability to reflect and decide whether a
particular new technology is one that serves our public good. Technologists, entrepreneurs,
policymakers, ethicists and legal scholars from Microsoft to MIT are now openly questioning
how artificial intelligence and what is called “machine learning” can be designed and/or
regulated to ensure such automated systems don’t do harm, from entrenching racial stereotypes,
or other forms of discrimination, in insurance, criminal justice, healthcare, or in many other
applications.

Nowhere is the dystopian vision of machines increasingly taking over human agency more
frightening than in the current research on lethal autonomous weapons systems, known as
“LAWS”. LAWS are weapons that utilize artificial intelligence to locate, identify, and attack
targets without human intervention. Dubbed ‘killer robots’ their critics argue these technologies
lack human morality and judgement, and point out the danger in assuming that the automation of
the exercise of lethal force is more ‘objective’ than human rationale.

While it is generally assumed that lethal autonomous weapons systems have not yet been
deployed, existing weapons systems that are deployed, particularly defensive weapons, share
some of the same characteristics. A Turkish state-owned defense company, STM, recently
unveiled a “kamikaze drone” complete with facial recognition technology.  Increasing military
investment in artificial intelligence, and what are known as “loitering munitions” (weapons
systems that can “loiter” in a target area for some time before automatically identifying a target
and striking) could make LAWS a reality within the next few years.

Those who advocate for the development of LAWS cite their several advantages. As
autonomous weapons lack a ‘control-and-communication link’ between system and operator,
they are seen as more secure, i.e. less likely to be vulnerable to interception and attack.  They
also point out that in addition to being more secure, autonomous weapons can act without the
delay between command from the operator and interpretation and execution by the system.
Countering critics concerns about their use, proponents argue that because these systems do not
feel fear, they are capable of making more rational decisions than human combatants.  The
argument here is that systems will not react to a threat with an intense need for self-preservation,
and will therefore be less violent and show greater restraint than a soldier.

The weaponization of this new technology raises questions of how that technology should be
governed and regulated. LAWS mark a paradigm shift in warfare. They challenge long standing
views on the morality of war and blur existing conceptions of responsibility in war. As
technology moves further from direct automation and towards systems that can adapt, learn, and adjust, their actions become increasingly unpredictable. By definition, imbuing a system with
autonomous functions means humans cannot control how they will react. The real issue here,
then, is that there is an unprecedented degree of autonomy in a weapons system, and no legal,
moral, ethical, or technological infrastructure to support, regulate, or govern it.

At present, debates on these challenges are taking place under the United Nation’s Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons in Geneva. The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres has
called for their prohibition in March of this year. The UN’s Group of Governmental Experts, a
subsidiary body of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, began meeting in 2016 to
bring together state signatories, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and
academic institutions in discussions on LAWS. Their most recent meeting was in November of
20129. Though the GGE has been discussing LAWS since 2016, little has been achieved
beyond defining LAWS and outlining ‘best practices’ for their use. In the GGE’s August 2018
meeting, 26 states advocated for a ban on fully autonomous weapons, while 12 states including
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, opposed a treaty on LAWS.

A report by the Human Rights Watch issued last year argues machines are unable to distinguish
between combatants and civilians, especially in armed conflicts where the lines between friend
and foe are unclear.  In these situations, the report argues, the opportunity for fratricide and
civilian death is high, and the pace of such an attack would be too fast for human intervention to
prevent it once it begins. From a legal perspective, the question of responsibility poses a major
challenge. How can a machine be held accountable for civilian deaths, or fratricide? Is it the
programmer who will be persecuted, even though the machine acts autonomously?

Experts have also expressed concerns over the unreliability of fully autonomous weapons and the
high risk of uncontrolled proliferation that would inevitably accompany development of LAWS.
In 2015, a large group of AI researchers and robotic engineers released an open letter calling for
a ban on lethal autonomous weapons.  As of 2018, the letter had over 20,000 signatures,
including those of Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak.

Advocacy efforts are largely centered in nongovernmental organizations. Campaign to Stop
Killer Robots, formed in October 2012, is a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
that is working to ban fully autonomous weapons and thereby retain meaningful human control over the use of force. 30 countries and the European Parliament have signed on to a call to ban
the technology.

For more information see PAX’s report titled “Slippery Slope: The Arms Industry and
Increasingly Autonomous Weapons” published on Nov. 11, 2019.

For how you can become engaged in advocacy against LAWS, please visit
www.stopkillerrobots.org

Nepal and the world lost a remarkable peacemaker this past November.   Padma Ratna Tuladhar passed in Kathmandu, Nepal at the age of 78.   A long time human rights activist and a former independent parliamentarian who never affiliated  with a single party, Patma Ratna played a key role in Nepal's peace process, along with his colleague, Daman Nath Dhunghana.  He served as a facilitator and mediator in talks with the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoists.   A long-time collaborator and member of the Peace Appeal's Advisory Board, he is remembered by the Peace Appeal's co-founder, Hannes Siebert:

"A dear friend, mentor and one of the world’s most extraordinary peacemaker departed today. He taught us what it is to LIVE peace and respect both ally, friend and enemy.  We traveled many journeys together.  The most significant was serving the Nepal Peace Process together. His moral and political compass was a guide I can never forget. Today  Nepal lost one of its most respected statesmen and peacemakers.  Padma Ratna helped guide most of its leaders, never stopped in his work to negotiate peace, and listened to all — from the downtrodden, the poor, and the country's top leadership.  Padma Ratna’s compassion, empathy and selfless service inspired us.  Thank you for the privilege to hold your hand and to be your friend. Will miss you dearly!"

Are refugee numbers the highest ever?  What were the origins of US Non-governmental support for refugees? What are the latest statistics from the Rohingya refugee crisis?  How do Mexicans view the "migrant caravan" traveling to the United States border?    These questions and more are featured in a new blog (W)HERE TO STAY?! featuring 30 Days of Posts in November to Educate and Inspire Action on refugees and the internally displaced.   To learn more visit the blog here, or on Facebook.

August 10, 2018.   Earlier today Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (“MDC”), formally contested the election results of the July 30th presidential and parliamentary elections.   Official election results were announced this past Thursday, August 2, giving sitting president Emmerson Mnangagwa, the head of the ruling ZANU-PF party, a slender victory with just 50.8% of the vote.  

Last month’s elections were the first since former President Robert Mugabe was ousted in November of 2017.  While hotly contested, the legitimacy of the poll has been seriously questioned for months with concerns raised about the independence of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, a system that favored incumbents, a biased media landscape and potential fraud in the conduct of the election, both in the lead-up to the actual poll and the counting and recording of ballots.   

For the last 18 months, the Peace Appeal has been supporting our partner, the Zimbabwe Council for Churches (“ZCC”), as it worked across political, religious, tribal, gender and class  lines to  foster renewed civic engagement in Zimbabwe, and more recently to mount a robust election monitoring campaign.   In the lead-up to the election, ZCC mobilized over 1,000 volunteers from across the country to participate in election monitoring.  It also recruited dozens of international observers from Europe, Africa and Australia, including the Peace Appeal’s co-chair, Shirley Moulder, to join their national counterparts. 

As reported by local and international observers, election day itself was relatively peaceful.  However the post-election period was marred by violence as Zimbabwe’s Army sent tanks into the streets of its capital Harare and killed a number of opposition protestors who had taken to the streets in advance of the final election results being announced.   When those results were announced, the electoral commission reported that Mnangagwa had received just above the threshold that would have result in a second ballot.  The opposition believes the results are fraudulent,  and the courts have two weeks to make a ruling on the petition submitted today.

In this tense environment, the Zimbabwe Council of Churches has called for non-violence and dialogue.  In a pastoral statement  issued last Friday, the ZCC called upon the ruling party to engage with the MDC Alliance through dialogue, offering the churches services as needed.    The statement further asked the ruling party, ZANU-PF recognize the complaints of the opposition, and reform the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.  It calls upon the MDC itself to address their concerns through the courts, and pursue nonviolent action.  

​In the coming months, the Peace Appeal will continue its support of the efforts of the ZCC and its local partners, as they work for national renewal.

December, 2017.   ​A coalition of civil society groups, representing Zimbabwe’s leading religious bodies, labor and human rights organizations, women, youth and disabilities movements, Media associations, students and more have come together to advance democratic reforms at this historic moment in Zimbabwe’s history. Calling themselves the National People’s Convention, their new effort is to launch a National Envisioning Process, which seeks to rally together citizens of Zimbabwe to make the most of the opening of the democratic space in Zimbabwe.

The Peace Appeal and our partners have been working with one of the lead organizers in this effort, the Zimbabwean Council of Churches (“ZCC”) whose General Secretary attended the Third Conference on National Dialogues in Helsinki in April.   Plans for advancing inclusive dialogue in anticipation of elections in 2018 were accelerated with the dramatic developments leading to the resignation of Mugabe last month.

In the last few weeks, four gatherings have been convened in Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare, as well as the cities Bulawayo and Mutare.   As the year comes to a close, organizers are developing a long term structured initiative to galvanize public participation in developing a cohesive vision for the nation both in advance of next year’s elections and to continue over the next several years.   

​On the one year anniversary of the “Unite the Right” rally and protests in Charlottesville, Virginia held in 2017, we revisit the reflections of our board colleagues, Derek Brown and Jeff Seul.  Derek offered his reflections on the events in the community that he calls home. Jeff offered his thoughts on the challenging question of whether dialogue was a sufficient mechanism for social change, following the rallies held in Boston the weekend following Charlottesville's events.  

On a Friday evening last August, my wife and I attended a standing room only ecumenical service at St. Paul’s Memorial Church here in Charlottesville, which was organized in response to the “Unite the Right” rally scheduled for the following day.  The rally, as most in this country now know, involved dozens of self-identified white nationalists, white supremacists and neo-Nazis, including the National Socialist Movement, Vanguard America, Identity Europa..                                                                           continued

We received many appreciative reactions to Derek Brown’s August 28th reflections on recent events in Charlottesville, Virginia, his family’s home.  A few people also questioned whether dialogue is sufficient for promoting change in polarized societies.  What about the role of organized protest, advocacy before legislatures and executive agencies, and even litigation?  Can dialogue really contribute to positive change?
continued

May 30, 2017.   This past week, Burma’s Union Peace Conference reconvened for the third time in 18 months.   Known as the “21rst Century Panglong” (a reference to the 1947 meeting between Burma's interim head of government, Aung San - father of today's State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi - and ethnic leaders from the Shan, Kachin and Chin), the conference brought together an estimated 740 delegates, plus many non-seated observers, from throughout the country to engage in a comprehensive dialogue seeking to end the country’s ongoing violent political conflicts and establish a new federal structure for a unified, peaceful Burma.

After extending discussions by an additional day in an attempt to find solutions to contentious issues, the conference concluded Monday with a first phase agreement.  The “Pyidaungsu Accord" incorporated 37 high level principles that emerged from state and regional dialogues, including basic commitments to democracy and federalism, and fundamental principles covering economic, social sector, regional development and land and the natural environment.   Key sticking points among parties remain (including commitments to “non-secession”).   Not all parties to the nation's conflict were present, 7 ethnic parties had left early.   In the next phase all parties will need to be engaged, and key issues and the modalities of power sharing and the country’s future federal structure will need to be addressed.

"Managing Complexity, Breaking Deadlocks and Building Consensus "
A Background Paper for the Third Conference on National Dialogues, April 5-6, 2017

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of National Dialogues, as seen from a planning and facilitation perspective, is its bewildering complexity. In Burma the Panglong conference that met for the first time in January 2016 consisted of 900 representatives from the government and army; ethnic minorities and 18 armed groups; and more than 90 democratic parties/groups. In Yemen, the National Dialogue Conference had 565 representatives, representing political parties and movements, ethnic representatives, women and youth, 50% to represent the South and 30% women. Not only is the sheer size of such meetings intimidating, but more so the range of political interests, the depth of distrust, the seeming irreconcilability of competing interests and issues, and the fragility of the arrangement that must hold all together. 

It is accepted that, given the homegrown quality of National Dialogues, there will and should be no one-size-fits all answer to the above questions. There seems to be an almost naïve assumption that dialogue will be successful if only protagonists can be brought into the same room (or hall). This is not the case, as the list of National Dialogues that did not have any lasting impact is considered, as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Togo, Yemen, Bahrain, Swaziland, Sudan – to name but a few.

The following dynamics regarding planning for and managing National Dialogues deserve ongoing attention:

1.    Many National Dialogues fail because of political capture. This happens when the ruling party or external actors seek to control the outcome of the process by exerting undue pressure on who to include, the formulation of the agenda, and the procedures adopted. What options are available for facilitators when faced with political capture? What rules of engagement need to be in place to ensure a level playing field?

​2.    The inclusion of the military, armed or highly radicalized groups that may resort again to armed resistance or violent disruptions, is a particularly complex and important issue. It is important to understand the drivers and root causes behind radicalization, but also how to engage in dialogue with radicalized groups given circumstances of international policies and sanctions. It is equally important to understand the dynamics of changing the “instruments” of dealing with existential conflicts (from military tools to dialogue tools). This is an acute dilemma faced by facilitators of dialogue. Ongoing reflection and research is very critical.

3.    The process of fostering confidence in dialogue as a viable option needs much attention. Military actors in particular must be convinced to move their conflict from the battlefield to the dialogue table. It implies the existence of a “table” that inspires confidence and promises better alternatives to military strategies. But what precisely does confidence-building entail? What does confidence-building mean in a context of terror attacks, drones and clandestine or open external support for military options? Is a “mutually hurting stalemate” indeed a precondition for successful talks?
 
4.    Interference in or pressure by external actors add to the stress placed on National Dialogues. The management of external actors therefore poses considerable challenges to the facilitators of National Dialogues. At the same time, few National Dialogues could take place without some form of external support, whether political, technical or financial. It is important to develop a better understanding of risks associated with undue external interference, but also of international indifference. It may also imply the development of codes of conduct for INGOs who seek to provide support, but without consideration of what is already in place and without respect for the principles of collaboration and national ownership.

5.    Essential elements that need to be agreed on in the initial dialogue framework agreement that precedes the start of the National Dialogue, include: criteria for inclusive participation; mandating of dialogue structure and outcome, and establishing formal links to constitutional, governance and change instruments; inclusive political managing structure(s) and accountability mechanisms; decision-making procedures; core principles and values; agreement on its purpose, objectives and what it is intended to change and agree on – developing an inclusive broad agenda framework; appointment of a multi-partial, non-stakeholder-driven secretariat and management; financial and administrative responsibilities; etc.

“Self-mediation” procedures and design elements in National Dialogues

One of the many consistent patterns in failed or weak formal National Dialogue processes is the absence or under-development of deliberate, integrated and coherent designs of “self-mediation” components and procedures. We will outline a few here for discussion:
 
a.    The strategic process, dialogue roadmap and facilitation strategy that is implemented has been shown to have a determining impact on the outcome of dialogue processes. There are various matters in need of ongoing discussions and joint learning in this respect, including:
•    The most appropriate and contextual infrastructure for the talks, including the formation of management and facilitation task teams, the structure of the table (or conference room), facilitation strategies, committees, expert panels, and procedural rules.
•    Consistent and structured practices regarding the generation of options (research, consultations, comparative studies, stakeholder proposals, hidden messages, technical committees, drafting committees, etc.)
•    The procedures, techniques and structures for decision-making, deadlock-breaking and consensus building (One Text, technical experts, options generation, indabas, dialogue circles and trees, interactive multi-track processes, etc.).
•    Decision-making arrangements (full consensus, sufficient consensus, voting for consensus, 2/3 majority, or a scale or combination of options).

b.    The role of shared knowledge creation to enable dialogue participants to operate from a basis of credible and jointly owned knowledge is increasingly recognized.  Attention to this aspect would include:
•    identify information gaps; 
•    Structured and systematic ongoing mapping of stakeholder proposals, positions, interests; their common ground and differences (to feed into the facilitation strategy design and One-Text decision-making process)
•    enable joint knowledge creation and “fact discovery”; 
•    move from “facts and perceptions”, to “facts and facts” — acknowledging and seeing each other’s realities; 
•    technical information and common understanding of conceptual frameworks and systems; 
•    jointly developing inclusive agenda frames that acknowledge the needs, hopes, brokenness and expectations from all sides;
•    Ongoing joint conflict assessment and facilitation strategy development by Secretariat, Facilitation Task Groups, Technical Committees and Consensus-building bodies.

c.    The National Dialogue should also enable people’s voices to be heard. This includes linking tracks 1, 2 and 3; welcoming and respecting submissions from the public; and ensuring a constructive media policy.

Working towards a working definition of formal National Dialogues – evolving common understandings from past two conferences:

Following the discussions and reports from the Helsinki National Dialogue Conferences in 2014 and 2015, some shared understandings have emerged that we cover in this section.  There remain, however, significant areas that needs joint reflection and research to capture the extent of these instruments’ extraordinary complexity.  The recent publication of the Berghof/Swisspeace handbook for practitioners, the HD publication for third parties support, and the ongoing development of the Peace and Dialogue Platform have all contributed significantly to the evolving body of knowledge emerging from these processes.

In order to define formal National Dialogues a number of distinctions were made during the past conferences. First, a National Dialogue is a highly inclusive process involving, as far as is possible, the complete spectrum of political diversity in a society. It is therefore to be distinguished from processes, often conducted by external mediators, that engage only with armed actors or the most prominent protagonists. 

Second, the objective with National Dialogues is to arrive at a new constitutional dispensation or a fundamental re-organisation of the political and statutory landscape. It can therefore be distinguished from, for example, international mediation interventions that have the intention to achieve a very specific political or military settlement (such as, for example, SADC’s mediation of the crisis in Madagascar) that do not necessarily require a substantive revision of the constitutional foundation of a society. 

Third, these dialogues, as in Myanmar, South Africa, Yemen and Lebanon, have a formal character, meaning that they are set up in order to impact on the statutory landscape and that have, therefore, to feed into formal legal procedures. They are therefore to be distinguished from informal or Track Two dialogue processes. 

Fourth, formal National Dialogue processes, especially those that have been successful, may not be restricted to a once-off event, but may evolve through different formats and conclude in a constituent assembly. In both South Africa and Nepal the National Dialogue took a decade to produce a new constitution, relying on different iterations of the dialogue platform across this period. In some countries, such as Lebanon, a National Dialogue platform has been established to pursue ongoing dialogue in the aftermath of a political settlement. 

Fifth, and very important, National Dialogues are homegrown and self-managed processes. In Myanmar 5 stakeholder groups from more than 90 parties, government, army and armed groups designed their own dialogue frameworks. Collectively, they spent the last two years negotiating the final dialogue and change instruments. While national stakeholders may accept external support in some or other form, a National Dialogue is not mediated by external actors nor designed to meet international interests or concerns. It is, first and foremost, a national attempt at solving its own contradictions. Part from its formal constitutional role, the National Dialogue also becomes a shared space for reconciliation and to develop common visions for their future.

A working definition of a National Dialogue is, therefore, that it is a formally mandated process of political dialogue that is inclusive, self-mediated and aimed at forging broad consensus in a highly diverse and polarized society on the values, principles and rules that should govern peaceful co-existence. A National Dialogue may take place at various stages of a peacemaking process and need not take place in the same format. It is therefore an open, adaptive process that should be defined by its broad objective and thrust and not by the particular format it takes. 
________________________________________________________

The questions and considerations for this session include: 

-    what are the planning, management, facilitation, shared knowledge and procedural measures that must be in place in order to manage the complexity of National Dialogues? 
-    what are the key structural and “self-mediation” elements that needs to be built-into formal National Dialogues to enable consensus-building, common understanding of issues, and deadlock-breaking?
-    National Dialogues as third-party instruments for mediation; and National Dialogues as sovereign “self-mediation” instruments;
-    comparing negotiation, mediation and dialogue across tracks.

Two-thirds of U.S.-based nonprofit organizations working abroad are facing problems accessing financial services, according to a comprehensive report released by the Charity and Security Network.  (The Peace Appeal Foundation is a member of the network, and serves on its Executive Board.)  The study illustrates a growing challenge to peacebuilding and humanitarian relief organizations working in conflict zones globally.  Though focused on US-based organizations, the challenge to US  organizations is part of a broader trend restricting the operations of civil society organizations globally.

The report, Financial Access for U.S. Nonprofits, is based on the first-ever empirical study of the global phenomenon known as “derisking,” as it relates to U.S.-based NPOs. Derisking refers to financial institutions terminating or restricting business relationships to avoid rather than manage risk. The report also reflects information from numerous focus group sessions and interviews with stakeholders over the last year. It outlines and analyzes the scope, frequency, and prevalence of various financial access problems, including delayed wire transfers, account refusals and closures, and unusual additional documentation requests. The report also provides recommendations to address these challenges. Author Sue E. Eckert of the Center for New American Security noted, “At a time of unprecedented need in regions of conflict, humanitarian crises, and natural disaster, American charities’ efforts to save lives and prevent the further erosion of democracy and human rights are being stymied unnecessarily. The data are clear: there is a serious and systemic problem that must be addressed.”

Among the major findings:

• 2/3 of all U.S. nonprofits that work abroad are having financial access difficulties
• Delays in wire transfers, which can last up to several months, are the most common problem, affecting 37% of nonprofits
• Problems opening and maintaining accounts affect 9.5% and 6.3% of NPOs, respectively
• 15% of nonprofits report having these problems constantly or regularly. Transfers to all parts of the globe are impacted; the problem is not limited to conflict zones or fragile and failing states
• NPOs, categorically treated as high-risk, are sometimes forced to move money through opaque channels as a result of delays in wire transfers and requests for additional documentation.
• When money cannot be transmitted in a timely manner, 42% of nonprofits report that they sometimes carry cash.
  

“The details here are frankly disturbing. We are undermining the networks that support development and that hold the world together. Most policymakers in Washington have no idea how bad this is,” said Brian Atwood, Senior Fellow, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, and former Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

These challenges have made it difficult for nonprofits to access the financial services necessary to provide life-saving aid to people in global hot spots where the need is greatest. For example:

• One NPO was prevented from sending immediate relief to populations in Myanmar, in the midst of a dire humanitarian crisis. Timely transmittal of those funds might have saved lives, the charity’s director explained.
  
• Two clinics for Syrian refugees, one in Saida and another Akkar, were forced to close because NPOs could not get funds to the clinics.
• Working in dangerous and uniquely challenging environments, NPO staff and contractors can face physical jeopardy when funds are not available. One recounted a situation in the field where people expecting to be paid showed up with guns.
• A children’s charity was informed by their financial institution that operating in Afghanistan raised their risk profile, and would lead to difficulties with their other accounts globally. So the charity reluctantly closed down the Afghan literacy program for nomadic children and returned funds to the donor. “If we’re not in there, the Taliban will be,” a representative from the charity said.

These examples are representative of the consequences of NPOs’ financial access difficulties, which stem from excessive regulatory expectations and lack of clarity. Without greater certainty, enabling banks to offer services to NPOs, financial institutions’ risk-reward calculation will continue to be weighted towards derisking. “Financial access is essential to the global economy and the banking industry needs regulatory clarity in their risk management process for it to occur,” according to John Byrne EVP of the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists, “and that certainty does not exist today.”
Because nonprofits contribute to peace and security around the world, “finding a solution to the problem should be a priority for the U.S. government,” said Kay Guinane, director of the Charity & Security Network.

Regulators are tasked with ensuring the safety and security of the banking system,” explained Scott Paul, senior humanitarian policy advisor at Oxfam America. “In doing so, they impose steep penalties for undercompliance but none for overcompliance.”

To read the report, go to charityandsecurity.org/FinAccessReport

This past November, Nepal celebrated the 10th Anniversary of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, which brought a formal end to Nepal’s decade long civil war.  To commemorate the occasion, the Nepal Transitions to Peace Institute with the support of the United States Agency for International Development, the Swiss Foreign Ministry and the European Union, hosted a multi-day international conference in Kathmandu from November 16-18.    Attending were many of the inside actors who participated in formal and back channel talks and negotiations, as well as national and international advisers and facilitators.  The Peace Appeal’s Hannes Siebert and Andries Odendaal were invited speakers.   Siebert, who along with Swiss Envoys Guenther Bachler, and later Markus Heiniger, played a senior advisory role in supporting many of the talks leading up to the Accord and in the months and years following.  Odendaal worked extensively with Nepali counterparts in the preparation and planning for a nationwide network of local peace committees.

10 years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord, Nepal's path towards peace is still a work in progress.  The country only approved a new constitution in 2015.  It was met with significant opposition by some parties in the country.  This past year saw the much delayed launch of official processes of the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which has in the last months received over 57,000 complaints, and it’s Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared (an estimated 1,300 people disappeared in the country’s civil war).  Transitional justice processes are slow and difficult, and are under great scrutiny by both Nepalese and the international community.  Though there are inspiring examples of community level reconciliation efforts, too few communities have been reached. Justice in Nepal, and greater opportunity for its deeply impoverished rural communities, will require sustained effort for years to come. ​

Burma's Historic National Dialogue
​
Update from Yangon
September 30, 2016

After 50 plus years of conflict between Myanmar/Burma's central government and many of its ethnic minorities, the newly elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League of Democracy (the "NLD") hopes to fulfill the promise of the country's fledgling peace process.  Earlier this month, 700 representatives of the country’s ethnic parties, armed groups, the Myanmar Army, and the Burmese government concluded the second round of the Union Peace Conference.   This historic conference and the ongoing political dialogue processes taking place nationally and regionally within Burma is mandated to resolve the ethnic conflict and design the structure of the new “Democratic Federal Union”.  The gathering highlighted new challenges to the peace process, as Burma's ethnic alliances continued to splinter. Though substantial progress has been made over the last three years, the NLD government must navigate a political transition that has entered a more complicated and challenging phase.   

The increasing complexity of Burma's political transition has deep historical roots, as well as more recent origins.  Prior to the inauguration of National League of Democracy government, the government of former General Thein Sein had entered into a national ceasefire negotiation with the country’s ethnic armed groups, many of whom had negotiated separate, individual bi-lateral ceasefires with the government previously.  Despite broad agreement on core principles by nearly all parties, ultimately only eight groups signed the "nationwide ceasefire agreement" with the government.  Others opted out, some indicating that they preferred to wait for Aung San Suu Kyi’s party to assume leadership of the country before proceeding.  However in the months since the NLD government took office, no new signatories have been added, and in several areas of the country occupied or controlled by the non-signatories to the ceasefire, violence has flared up, most recently resulting in the dislocation of thousands of civilians along the country’s border with Thailand.

How to move the peace process forward at both the national and state/regional level at this juncture is the central challenge.  Both the nationwide ceasefire agreement and subsequent talks laid out plans for a national dialogue process, of which the recently concluded session of Union Peace Conference is one part.   With the changing environment, these plans are being revised, but it is anticipated that Burma's national dialogue process will continue for at least three to five years at both the national and sub-national levels.  Its fundamental purpose is to provide a forum for a more consensus driven redrawing of a federal Burmese State.   Bringing all parties to the table is critical.   In the initial session of the Union Peace Conference held last January (before the NLD assumed leadership of the government), only those ethnic armed groups who were signatories to the ceasefire attended as full members.   In this month’s sessions, after much government outreach and support from international governments, including China, nearly all ethnic armed groups attended in some capacity.

However the Union Peace Conference showed that the envisioned participation of Burma’s many ethnic armed groups and political parties in the current national process will not be as a unified entity.  Indeed some walked out of the Union Peace Conference.  Three likely blocs are emerging; each with distinct views on how to engage in the future process and varying ideas of what a new Burmese State should look like.   These blocs include: the signatories to the original ceasefire (comprising some of the largest  ethnic armed groups, including the Karen National Union and others); a second bloc representing those non-signatories to the original process who are nonetheless willing to engage with the NLD government, including the Kachin, Mon, and Kayah ethnic groups; and a third set of parties, representing ethnic armed groups, such as the United Wa State Army (an ethnic armed group located in territory bordering China), who are more reticent to join in the process.  Balancing these interests, those of the military which still holds 25% of the seats in Parliament, and those of her own constituents in the National League of Democracy, will be a massive challenge for Aung San Suu Kyi, in her capacity as State Counselor.  Much support has been given to date, but even more will be needed if this transition is to be successful.    

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Photos: Aung San Suu Kyi addressing Union Peace Conference and delegates at the Union Peace Conference courtesy of KNU Headquarters.

The Peace Appeal Foundation is pleased to announce that Kristiina Rintakoski has joined the organization’s Board of Directors. Kristiina brings a wealth of experience in peacebuilding globally. She presently works as a Director for Peacebuilding and Advocacy at the Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission, one of the largest Finish civil society organizations working in global development. She has over 15 years of experience in policy analysis and programme planning in mediation support, peacebuilding and national dialogue processes. Regionally much of her work has focused on Myanmar, Syria and Nepal. Before joining FELM, she served as Programme Director at the Crisis Management Initiative for 10 years, leading the development of CMI’s crisis management, conflict resolution and peacebuilding projects and activities. Prior to that, she worked at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. She holds Master’s degrees in International Relations from the University of Tampere, Finland and in Human Rights from the University of Padova, Italy. 

​In this season during which people of many cultures and faiths celebrate renewal, we share with you a poem written by Fr Michael Weeder, a board member of the Peace Appeal Foundation.   Michael is Dean of St. George's Cathedral in Cape Town, a church once led by Archbishop Tutu. The poem was written in Helsinki, Finland at a conference on the role of dialogue in peace and national change processes.   It was started in the hours after the attacks in Paris and Beirut.   

Michael's poem echoes the work and values of many, including Aung San Suu Kyi's recent remarks on the need to reach out to Myanmar's former rulers, as well as to the words of Archbishop Tutu and his daughter Mpho, in their powerful recent book, The Book of Forgiving: The Fourfold Path for Healing Ourselves and Our World. Its theme of forgiveness is central to the work of peacemakers everywhere, to the possibility of renewal more broadly, and to hopes for peaceful coexistence in our tumultuous world.